Ehrlich contrasts a 'dynamic conception of law'-which legal science until then was ill-equipped to fathom-with the 'traditional, dogmatic concep tion' of a bounded set of legal rules governed by formal logic and sophis ticated doctrine'! To understand law in its dy namic conception, Ehrlich suggests that we turn to three sources: decisions of the courts (mindful that every decision is the result of a number of factors, only one of which is the text of a legal rule); actual legal transactions that have not had to resort to courts or government agencies for adjudication; and, most importantly, the 'facts of daily life, apart from their legal aspect'. 'In reality life creates primarily its own rules', apart from the rules of law.8 Legal scholars should undertake investigations of real life and furnish them back to the courts to inform judicial decisions. for solving practical problems; and finally some modest proposals for work.
THE DESCRIPTIVE VERSUS REGISTER IN FIN-DE-SIECLE ETHNOGRAPHY
is a familiar term to us, but we should not assume too much; its meaning has undergone considerable slippage since Ehrlich's time. It is worth briefly, how ethnography was understood in Austria
Hungary at the turn of the century.
Ethnography was first as a descriptive genre. Critical think ers dating back to Kant have marked a categorical difference between a descriptive work and a normative Ehrlich articulated his of this demarcation in the of Montesquieu's des Lois that he wrote for Justice HolInes. The French term del/oir permits an the of 'ought' and 'is', he says, signifying 'both what ought to be and what must be'. Montesquieu mostly uses deuoir in the for mer meaning, but he was influenced enough by natural law beliefs 'as not to be and the law that is', to draw a sharp line between the law that 11 This should not be read as the start of an argument for environmental or social determin ism nor, necessarily, a claim for uniqueness. It is rather an effort to explore the particulars of Ehrlich's context. 12 Ethnographers from Bukovina and Galicia working at the time as Ehrlich did as a publishing jurist include the team working out of Cviv (or, in or of Xv Volkov, M Zubritskiy, M Russov, M Litvinova-Bartush, Veretelnyk, M Shishkevych, V Domanitzkiy, 01 Radakov, M Dikarev; famed folklorist V Hnatiuk; folklorist and writer Aleykum; ethnographer of legal affairs S overlapping with the last decade of career, B The ethnographer was collector and describer; his work involved collecting data through surveys, usually in rural areas, and writing it up into detailed descriptions.
BEYOND IS VERSUS OUGHT
That said, we should be aware that Ehrlich and his central European peers regarded ethnography as potentially more active than we would be prone to.
Even if a description was not delivered in a normative register, Ehrlich and his contemporaries understood that description under some circumstances could be creative-a form of performative speech. As the German, so the Romanian and the Slav gladly quenches his thirst and draws strength from the fountain of German science; this in greater measure will offer the means to and nurture his individuality; but it will also be an inducement to work and strive together toward the happiness and glory of our beloved fatherland, Austria.23
Reading these words today, we must remind ourselves that 'Germany ' was a nascent project, having just formed as a unified country in 1871. not asked their nationality but which language they spoke and which confession they belonged to. Also problematic, not all languages that were spoken in the realm could be selected as a mother tongue, only those that were recognised as 'national in the terms of art XIX of the 1867 Constitution. This ruled out Yiddish; most Yiddish-speaking Jews from Galicia chose Polish and most from Bukovina chose German. This clarification adapted from Weiler, above n 5. 
history;
German. ... [a 1 numerous priesthood, which is made up for the most part of the same families in which this office is usually hereditary, and this priesthood, spread over a wide territory, forms a nation within a nation, which has its own traditions and its own customs. 49
Governing in the Vernacular
As he encounters them, Ehrlich treats such professional groups as one of the human associations to be studied for their legal practices; this insight and methodological inclusion marks a significant point of departure from other ethnographers of his day, the Bogosics and the Bobcsevs. Ehrlich considered both ethnic and professional groups the objects of legal ethnography, treat ing the two categories as practically analytical equals.
Ethnic groups then were a complicated category, in ethnography and within the law of the empire. of the state are equal in their rights, and each nation has the 111\ lola ble rIght to preserve and to promote its nationality [NatlOnalitat] and language. For all whose use IS customary in a land, the state recognizes equality of rights in schools .
IllStitutlOns, and public life. In those crownlands inhabited by more than one n,ltlnrl.
In,tltutJons of education shall enable each of the nations to be educated III Its 1.111, u lC;,.
belllg compelled to learn a second language of the land.') to tradition German "Mutter", for example, explains changes related to a specific communicative practice, duel ling. Prior to the Liberal reforms, a gentile man might offer an insult to a Jew on the street, knowing that a jew's status meant that one could ignore a demand for satisfaction in a duel. Army officers not only could demand satisfaction, they were obliged to by the Austrian officer corps' code, and other officers were obliged to support each other's to satisfaction. ['It is against the army's notion of honor to refuse chivalrous satisfaction terliche Genugtuung) to a person simply because he belongs to another nation or religious community.'] A GUIde for Reserlle Officers commenting on the case of a German nationalist military academy student who lost his rank the army refusmg ,atisfaction to a Jewish student who challenged him to a cited in I Deak,
SoldIers in Austro Hunganan SocIety
York, Leo Baeck 21. As the army more Jewish officers (by 1897, everv fifth officer was a Jew) there was an mcreasmg chance that a Jewish man one met on the street be a reserve officer and able to demand satisfaction. The incidence of provocative msults to met Jews dropped.
'natives'. 'the legal command, to practice, as it obtains in a associa tion, perhaps of very even without any formulation in words '.64 worried that legal authorities increasingly slighted legal norms in the era of Introductory textbooks assure us that:
... customary law is of equal force with written law. Yet, if one looks the actual practice rather than the verbal expression, one will soon come to the conclusion that treatises, essays, and decisions proceed from an assumption-never, of course, openly confessed-that there really is no except statutory law.65
The thrust of Ehrlich's argument here is key: of beings are formed when individuals recognise certain rules of binding. It is to note how this conception of law departs from the Free School. Although Ehrlich does not frame his conception of law as a rejec tion of the Free School's, we are no longer talking about stuff to fill gaps in the Code. We are talking about multiple discourses that carry on and independently of the Code, which Ehrlich proposes judges and call on as sources of information about existing law when the decision-maker encounters a gap in law that happens to be writ ten down already. Without fanfare, reframes the Free School discus of 'gaps' into an account of legal pluralism.
To say that law is more than commands of the state at this point would be redundant. Forestalling some formalist critics, in his inaugural address as rector in Ehrlich reported conclusions about customary law from his long research into Roman legal history, but as its title shows, he framed it for the contemporary argument. In Die Tatsache des Gewohnheitrechts (The Fact of Customary Law), he concludes that:
... when the classical Roman jurists of ius civile they mean Roman customary law; but when they quite generally speak of mores or consuetudo, they do not.l° This address seems a carefully calculated attempt to head off critics who argue that going beyond the state for a definition of law means just anything could be classified as 'law'. Ehrlich anticipates that argument and his model against it by demarcating an inside and an outside of Roman customary law. To some extent, though, it cannot be avoided that demarcation is in tension with the holism that underwrites his concep tion of society and law. The boundary problems that orality, custom and ultimately ethnography raise are still with us.
The radical innovation that Ehrlich proposes to the Free School is that the judge's sense of what to do in an instant case be predominantly Every true work of science is a work of art, and the man who is not an artist is a poor man of science. Production of a work of science requires the same qualifica tions as production of a work of art.S1
He understood this to have methodological implications. As artists:
. This is a different kind of authoritative discourse, different from existing 'icience and law. Ethnography in Ehrlich's hands does not furnish bricks to huild a grand edifice, but the components for a simple mirror. The techno 1-(lgy does not fix the image in place; in fact, it is chosen because it reflects the contemporary, the emergent. The ethnographer holds it up so that we ,ee the scientific claim, the legal authority, is the prosaic, changing image of llurselves and our fellow persons in the
